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THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL
CONFERENCES: AN INTERIM REPORT
ON THE ONTARIO PRETRIAL
CONFERENCE EXPERIMENT
By MICHAEL STEVENSON*
GARRY D. WATsON:*-
EDWARD WEISSMAN ***
A. INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that the object of civil procedure is, or should
be, to obtain not only a just determination of all disputes, but to do so
speedily and at reasonable expense. However, today in Canada (and else-
where) justice in the higher courts is expensive, and, if litigation proceeds
all the way to trial, the process is far from speedy. The extent of delay varies
from court to court, but in the large urban centres of Canada a timespan of
three years from the commencement of proceedings to trial is not uncommon.
While delay in litigation has many causes, once the case is placed on a trial
list, ready for and awaiting trial, delay is largely a function of the court's
ability (or inability) to reach the case for trial. In broad terms, this "court
related" delay is a result of too many cases requiring trial in relation to the
available judge time.
In an attempt to combat court congestion, delay, and the high cost of
litigation, Canadian courts in the seventies have turned, as did their United
States counterparts in the sixties and earlier, to the use of pretrial confer-
ences.1 In Ontario, the Supreme Court has employed pretrial conferences in
civil jury cases in Toronto since 1975. The members of the Bar strongly sup-
ported the introduction of the procedure, and the court, attracted by the
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I Though not unknown, pretrial conferences were little used in Canada until the
1970's. Court rules in a number of Canadian jurisdictions now provide for pretrial con-
ferences: see, Alberta Rules of Court, Rule 219; British Columbia Supreme Court Rules,
Rule 35; Nova Scotia Procedure Rules 1971, Rule 26; Federal Court of Canada (General
Orders and Rules), Rule 491. The Ontario Rules of Practice presently make no pro-
vision for the holding of pretrial conferences. For a general discussion of pretrial con-
ferences in Canada and in the United States, see Ontario Law Reform Commission,
Report on the Administration of Ontario Courts, (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney
General, 1973) Part 3 at 107 et seq.
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potential of the procedure to increase the court's productivity, reduce the
cost of litigation and speed up the resolution of disputes, contemplated its
extension to the much larger Toronto non-jury list. At this point, however,
the court responded to the suggestion that the proposed extension of the pro-
cedure should be done in such a way as to permit close monitoring of its
effect, rather than simply extending the procedure and hoping for positive
results. This decision on the part of the court was the genesis of the experi-
ment reported here.2 Essentially, it was agreed that the procedure would be
introduced for only half of the cases on the non-jury list and that the court
would co-operate fully with the authors in permitting the collection of the
data necessary to evaluate the impact of pretrial conferences.
This article is a summary of the research design and the preliminary
results of this experimental project.3 The objective of the project is to deter-
mine, through a strictly controlled experimental study, the effects of the
introduction of pretrial conferences on the subsequent disposition of civil
cases set down for non-jury trial in the Supreme Court of Ontario at Toronto.
It has been generally assumed that the introduction of the pretrial conference
procedure has the effect of increasing the rate and speed of settlement and of
reducing the length of trial in those cases that go to trial. This project is
addressing itself, inter alia, to the following questions: whether or not these
effects do result from the holding of pretrial conferences; whether such effects
are common to all or only some types of litigation; whether such benefits are
of a magnitude sufficient to produce a net benefit to the court, taking into
account the judicial manpower required to conduct the pretrial conferences.
In the United States the use of pretrial conferences became prevalent
with the introduction of the procedure into the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1938. It has since been adopted in most state jurisdictions and it is
now widely used throughout the country, although the manner and intensity
of its use varies from court to court. The utility and effectiveness of pretrial
conferences is a matter on which there is considerable disagreement. Based
upon personal experience many (perhaps the majority) of judges and lawyers
in the United States feel that trials are shortened and settlement rates in-
creased by the use of pretrial conferences. However, the only major empirical
study of the operation of pretrial conferences in the United States, conducted
in the early sixties in the New Jersey courts by Professor Maurice Rosenberg,
2 Earlier the Ontario Law Reform Commission, id. at 121, had suggested that con-
sideration be given to conducting a controlled experiment in Ontario in the use of pre-
trial conferences.
3 This Pretrial Conference Experiment Project is being directed by the authors, for
the Supreme Court of Ontario, under the auspices of the Canadian Institute for the
Administration of Justice and with the co-operation of the Institute for Behavioural
Research of York University. Financial support for the project is being received from
the Law Foundation of Ontario and the Ministry of the Attorney General of Ontario
through the budget of the Civil Procedure Revision Committee. This co-operation and
assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
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cast severe doubt upon these conclusions. 4 Using a "partially"5 controlled
experiment involving only personal injury cases, Professor Rosenberg con-
cluded that a pretrial conference procedure did not enhance the efficiency of
the judicial process. More specifically, he found that pretrial conferences did
not reduce the average length of trial, nor did they increase the rate at which
cases settled prior to trial. Indeed, Rosenberg concluded that the use of pre-
trial conferences actually reduced the court's efficiency, since additional
judge time was expended in conducting pretrial conferences without any
improvement in the disposition rate.0
The general applicability of Professor Rosenberg's conclusions have
been challenged in the United States7 and pretrial conferences continue to be
widely employed in that country. Many lawyers and judges still believe that
pretrial conferences eliminate the need for, or shorten, trials. The result is that
considerable confusion continues to exist as to the efficacy of pretrial in the
United States.8 Little is really known of the actual impact of pretrial confer-
ences in the Canadian context. In Ontario, members of the judiciary and the
Bar generally, strongly support the procedure but this project is the first
opportunity to systematically test the efficacy of pretrial conferences in any
jurisdiction in Canada. Furthermore, inasmuch as this project does not suffer
from the problems (faced by Rosenberg) of non-random selection to the ex-
perimental procedures9 and inasmuch as this project is not exclusively con-
fined to the analysis of personal injury litigation, this study may be seen as a
significant advance on the pioneering work in New Jersey.
The pretrial conference is a conference between the counsel in a case
and a judge, typically held several weeks before the trial date and after the
other pretrial proceedings are completed. 10 In Canada to date two basic
4 Rosenberg, The Pretrial Conference and Effective Justice (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1964).
5 Rosenberg was unable to structure his experiment so as to stream all the control
cases to trial without a pretrial conference. Lawyers in the control group were allowed
to request a pretrial conference if they wanted one. Hence, instead of having two groups
of cases (test and control) three groups resulted (mandatory pretried, optional pretried
and not pretried).
6 However, Rosenberg's study did conclude (supra, note 4 at 28 et seq) pretrial
conferences led to an improvement in the quality of trials in that, in pretried cases,
counsel were found to be better prepared, a clearer presentation of opposing theories
of counsel was more common, gaps and repetition in the evidence was reduced and
tactical surprise was curbed. We have not attempted to replicate this aspect of Rosenberg's
study; see infra, note 45.
' See, e.g., Becker, "Efficient Use of Judicial Resources," 43 Federal Rules Deci-
sions 421 (1967); Chantry, et al, "Pretrial Utility or Futility," 32 Ins. Counsel J. 602
(1965); Todd, "Pretrial Revisited," 50 Judicature 153 (1967).
8 See, for example, the recent Federal Judicial Center's District Court Studies
Project Interim Report (Washington: The Center, June 1976) 18-21, reporting data
indicating, for the majority of courts observed, an inverse relationship between judicial
involvement in settlement (through pretrial conferences) and terminations per judge.
9 See supra, note 5.
10 The timing of the conference may vary from court to court and from case to
case. Also in some courts, or cases, the clients may be expected to attend or to be
available for consultation.
1977]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
forms of pretrial conference have emerged. The first has as its principal goal
the readying of the case for an orderly trial: the trial oriented conference. The
second has as its major goal pretrial settlement of the case: the settlement
oriented conference.
In either form, the conference consists of a discussion between the judge
and counsel concerning the case. In the trial oriented conferences the major
emphasis is placed upon clarification and reduction of the issues in the case,
the limitation of the number of expert witnesses, the obtaining of admissions
of fact, and agreements to dispense with formal proof of documents. The
aim of such conferences is to reduce trial time, and to improve the overall
quality of the trial by increasing the preparedness of counsel, by facilitating
the avoidance of surprise, and by generally aiding the clear presentation of
the case. Typically, these trial oriented conferences will be conducted by the
judge assigned to try the case. The possibility of settlement may or may not
be discussed, but it is not the focus of the conference though it may be a by-
product thereof.
At the settlement oriented conferences, the presiding judge seeks,
through discussion with counsel, to assist them at arriving at an out-of-court
settlement. The role of the judge here is essentially that of conciliator or third
party mediator, who points out the strengths and weaknesses of each side's
case and who gives his opinion as to the likely outcome of the trial, in terms
of liability and damages. If it becomes clear that settlement is not possible,
some time may be spent on limiting and clarifying the issues to be tried.
The pretrial conferences conducted in this experiment were intended to
be primarily settlement-oriented rather than trial-oriented. They were not to
be "head-knocking" sessions at which settlement was forced upon the counsel
by the presiding judge, but rather exercises in third party mediation by the
judge. An important ground rule of the conferences, made clear to counsel
at the outset, was that under no circumstances would the judge presiding at
the pretrial be the trial judge in the action. All discussions would be treated
as confidential and privileged and would not be disclosed to any fellow judge.
It was felt, by the Court, that this ground rule would discourage "head-
knocking" and any likelihood or appearance of unfairness, and at the same
time encourage full disclosure and frankness on the part of participating
counsel.
The Rules of Practice governing proceedings in the Supreme Court of
Ontario (of which the High Court is simply the trial division) presently make
no provision for the holding of pretrial conferences. Hence, the conferences
conducted as part of this experiment were neither required nor specifically
sanctioned by the Riles. As explained below, the attendance of counsel was
secured by a letter of invitation from the judge who was to preside at the
conference. Although attendance was not mandatory in any legal sense, in
only a very few cases did counsel fail to attend a scheduled conference.
B. RESEARCH DESIGN
It is worth indicating why controlled experimental evaluation is parti-
cularly necessary in determining the impact of pretrial conferences. Today,
in almost any jurisdiction the settlement rate of cases is extremely high, vary-
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ing, depending on the jurisdiction, between 75-85% of all actions com-
menced. When a pretrial conference procedure is introduced, many cases
that are pretried will subsequently settle. But whether these settlements are a
result of the pretrial conference or represent settlements which would have oc-
curred in any event, cannot be determined in the absence of a control group,"
i.e., an identical group of contemporaneous cases which have not been sub-
jected to the pretrial conference experience. Moreover, since settlement rates
are very high, with or without pretrial conferences, very careful precise mea-
surement is necessary in order to isolate the impact of pretrial conferences.12
This project necessitated a number of novel approaches to the construction
of a research design because it was a controlled experiment carried out "in
the field." That is, while the research can be considered a true experimental
design, it is not being conducted in the artificially controlled environment of
a laboratory, but in the real world. While laboratory experiments have the
rigour of complete (or almost complete) control, this strength is the basis of
the major weakness of laboratory experiments, for the very artificiality of
the setting makes it difficult to generalize findings to the "real world." There
are a variety of problems associated with achieving a controlled experiment
in a real world environment. First, research design is difficult because of the
need to monitor the complex on-going process being studied, without affect-
ing it in the course of the study, i.e., without turning the "real" world into
an "artificial" world. A second problem is establishing the requisite control
while at the same time obtaining and retaining the full co-operation of all
participants in the milieu. In the context of this experiment obtaining the co-
operation of the court was essential. This itself involved a number of aspects:
the willingness of the court to initially acknowledge the need for experimen-
tation; the need to refrain, during the course of the experiment, from carrying
out other procedural or administrative reforms that seem plausible short-
term solutions to institutional problems; and the willingness of the court to
co-operate in the daily gathering of information. That this experiment is
being conducted, and that the degree of control obtained in the study has
1l Another (but inferior) way to attempt to measure the impact of pretrial con-
ferences is to compare settlement rates, etc., before and after the introduction of the
procedure. One of the co-authors, Garry Watson, in an earlier project attempted to use
this technique to measure the impact of the introduction of pretrial conferences on the
Toronto jury list. The attempt was unsuccessful and the results inconclusive for two
reasons. First, since the technique involved the comparison of statistics from different
time periods there was no control of extraneous factors or variables, e.g., procedural,
administrative or behavioural changes other than the pretrial conference. Secondly, the
data regularly collected by the court was insufficiently detailed to allow any form of
precise measurement. For a brief but useful discussion (citing examples) of research
techniques for evaluating court procedures and changes in the administration of justice,
see Rosenberg, supra, note 4 at 16 et seq.
12 As the recent Federal Judicial Centre Study, supra, note 8 at 20, states, "evaluat-
ing settlement procedures presents the same difficulty as evaluating remedies for the
common cold. All cold remedies appear to work as indicated by the fact that colds
always go away. Similarly, all settlement procedures succeed as indicated by the fact
that most cases settle no matter what procedures are used."
1977]
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been possible, is a direct result of the co-operation afforded by the Supreme
Court of Ontario'8 and the practising Bar in Toronto.
While the research design of this experiment uses complex statistical
techniques and methods, the overall approach is nevertheless straightforward:
to examine the differences in the manner and timing of disposition for cases
on the civil non-jury list in the Supreme Court of Ontario as a function of
whether or not they are assigned to pretrial conferences, and to indicate the
probability that such differences are due to pretrial intervention rather than
to chance or other factors. The ability to isolate this latter source of variation
is based upon the controlled assignment of any case to either the test condi-
tion (pretrial conference) or a control condition (no pretrial conference) by
a strictly random selection.
Every case on the civil non-jury list (this list does not include divorce
cases) 14 was classified as either personal injury or other.'5 This stratification
of the sample was done to ensure sufficient representation of personal injury
cases in the study, since it was hypothesized that this type of case was parti-
cularly amenable to settlement through pretrial conference.' 0 Randomly, each
case in the list of personal injury and other cases was assigned to either the
test (pretried) or control (not pretried) group. Each test case was assigned,
on a random basis, a paired control case. Thus, there were four groups of
13 Particular mention should be made of the contribution and support of Mr. Justice
Richard Holland, Mr. Justice Peter Cory, and Mr. Justice Willard Estey, Chief Justice
of the High Court (now a member of the Supreme Court of Canada).
14A separate list is operated for divorce cases. Contemporaneously with this project,
pretrial conferences were introduced in the Supreme Court of Ontario in Toronto in
divorce cases, but the impact of pretrial conferences in these cases is outside the ambit
of this study. For an account of the operation of the procedure in such cases, see Lieff,
Pre-Trial of Family Law in the Supreme Court of Ontario - Simplify and Expedite, 10
Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 300 (1976).
15 Inter-coder reliability (i.e., the agreement between three independent coders)
for this classification was perfect, r = +1.00. These two basic subject matter classifica-
tions have been further broken down as follows: personal injury (motor vehicle and
other); non personal injury (real estate, contract, and other). Analysis of any difference
amongst these further category breakdowns must await the completion of the experiment
when larger sample sizes in each category are available.
16This hypothesis was generated in discussions with members of the Court. The
reasoning was that a major issue in personal injury cases is almost invariably the amount
at which damages will be assessed. Since all of the cases are, ex hypothesi, on the non-
jury list, that assessment (if the case goes to trial) would be made by a High Court
judge, and the pretrial conference provides a forum in which a High Court judge can
give his tentative opinion as to the likely assessment of damages. Given these factors it
was felt that the pretrial conference might be particularly effective in achieving pretrial
settlements in personal injury cases. (This hypothesis is not in fact borne out by these
preliminary results, see infra at note 40.) In view of the differences between our pre-
liminary results and those obtained by Rosenberg as to the impact of pretrial confer-
ences, it is worth noting that our study dealt exclusively with non-jury cases, whereas
his dealt principally with cases bound for trial by a jury. See Rosenberg, supra, note 4
at 21.
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cases: test - personal injury; test - other; control - personal injury; control -
other. Personal injury cases were only paired with personal injury cases, etc.
Sampling was conducted in this manner in roughly two week intervals
throughout the year, taking the set of cases at the head of the list in each
time period as a separate cohort. That is, each block of cases sampled and
assigned at the same time was called a cohort. This temporal separation of
the sample will allow us to isolate the effects of changes over time, which
include certain things as "learning" by counsel about the operation of the
conferences, or changes in other court procedures introduced during the
course of the experiment.
17
The pairing between cases in test and control groups is a special feature
in the research design of this study. The effect of pairing is to create a nest
of two case mini-experiments. Usually attrition' 8 is a problem in field experi-
ments because test and control group cases may suffer from differential attri-
tion rates. In our experiment the technique of pairing allows us to attrite both
of these paired cases if one case attrites, making the remainder of the cases
less likely to be biased. The best way to understand pairing is to see it as a
randomly selected and assigned two case (N = 2) self-contained experi-
ment. (In fact, the experiment can be seen as a nest of Chinese boxes, pairs
within cohorts, and temporally distinct cohorts within the total sample).
The administration of the experiment, and the monitoring of the cases
and their progress through the list can now be summarized briefly. At the
commencement of the experiment in April 1976 all the cases then on the
Toronto non-jury list (excluding approximately 130 cases at the top of the
list)' 9 were identified and coded with the date upon which they were set
down for trial (i.e., added to the bottom of the trial list) and classified according
17 One such change introduced during the course of the experiment was a "trial
blitz," involving a concentration of judicial manpower in Toronto to try non-jury cases
during the fall of 1976 (September - December, 1976). As opposed to the normal
situation, in which the number of judges hearing cases in Toronto non-jury range be-
tween one and five, during the blitz a minimum of five judges sat continuously to hear
cases on the Toronto non-jury list. In addition, during the blitz period different case
scheduling techniques were in effect to expedite the flow of cases to the increased panel
of judges. This preliminary report does not, in fact, include more than a handful of cases
which were subject to the blitz experience. Our final report will, however, deal with a
large number of such cases. However, the sampling techniques referred to above, i.e.,
temporal separation and pairing, will enable us to provide independent estimates of the
effect of the blitz and the pretrial conference on the disposition of cases.
18 By attrition we mean the slippage of cases from the experiment before the rele-
vant measurements can be made, e.g., test cases may attrite through settlement prior to
being called to a pretrial conference, or may fail to attend at the pretrial conference.
(The actual reasons for attrition in this experiment are discussed in more detail, infra,
note 26.) Cases also disappeared from the non-jury list (e.g., through settlement) prior
to being sampled as part of the experiment. These cases never became part of the ex-
periment.
19 These cases were excluded simply because we wanted to avoid taking into the
experiment cases which might be called for trial before they could be pretried.
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to subject matter.20 From then on, a block of cases (a cohort) was taken
from the top of the list every few weeks.21
Ideally the time at which any cohort was drawn (and thus the ensuing
pretrial conferences held) in relation to the likely trial date of the cases in
the cohort, should have been constant over the course of the experiment in
order to hold constant the time before trial at which pretrial conferences were
held. Initially we attempted to do this. However, the rate at which cases are
reached for trial on the Toronto non-jury list is inevitably a function of judge
availability (which varies from week to week and month to month) and of
the length of trials in those cases heard by the court. The resulting variability
in the rate at which cases may be called for trial made it impossible to hold
constant the period between pretrial conference and trial dates. All that we
can say is that within cohorts the period between pretrial conference and
likely trial date was more or less constant: across cohorts it varied consi-
derably.22
Within each cohort the personal injury cases were randomly sampled for
test and control group assignment as were the non personal injury cases. The
resulting sampling status for each case was then coded. Counsel in those
cases assigned to pretrial conferences were notified of dates and times of
the conference in letters sent out over the signature of the judge who would
preside at the pretrial conference.23 These letters were sent out about two
weeks before the pretrial conferences. The date of the conference for the
test case was coded for both that particular test case and for its control pair.24
For both groups of cases, information as to the timing of settlement, trial,
adjournments, and appeal were subsequently coded, as was information as to
the terms of settlement or judgment. In addition, information was collected
20 A similar procedure was carried out for cases that were subsequently added to
the Toronto non-jury list. Initially we had anticipated that the number of cases on the
list as of April 1976 would provide us with the desired sample size. This turned out not
to be the case, and an additional (approximately) 200 cases, added to the list after April
1976 but appearing at the head of the list before May 1977, were taken into the experi-
ment. Hence, our final analysis will be based not upon (a portion of) the cases on the
list as of April 1976, but on the universe of cases surviving to the top of the list during
the period April 1976 - May 1977.
21 The number of cases in each cohort was basically twice the number of available
pretrial conference slots, so as to provide both test and control cases. In fact a slightly
greater number of cases were included in each cohort so as to ensure replacements of
pairs which attrited because the selected test cases could not, for one reason or another,
attend a scheduled pretrial conference.
22 In the analysis of the final data we will attempt to statistically estimate the effects
of variation in the timing of the pretrial conferences. However, this will present diffi-
culties, because it is impossible to determine what the trial dates would have been for
cases which settled after the pretrial conference.
2 3 This method of notification was decided upon by the Court. Ontario presently
has no rule authorizing the holding of pretrial conferences or requiring the attendance
of counsel at a pretrial conference. The Court felt that a personal request from the
presiding judge to counsel to attend the pretrial conference would maximize the likeli-
hood that counsel would attend the conference.
2 4 This information allows for testing of the hypothesis that pretrial conferences
produce more speedy settlements even if they do not affect the probability of settlement.
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from the pretrial conference judge about the nature of the conference in each
case.25 Further information was collected and coded relating to the damages
in dispute or other relief claimed, for payments into court, and for the iden-
tity of counsel involved in each case.
The analysis presented here is based on the first 307 cases sampled as
part of the experiment between April and August 1976. Not all of these cases
were used in the analysis, however, for the following reasons. First, some
cases were struck from the list or adjourned sine die prior to or at trial and
hence had not reached final disposition at the time of this analysis. Second,
in some cases trials had been concluded, but reserve judgments had not been
handed down at the time of the analysis. Third, a large number of cases were
attrited because of problems of scheduling and holding pretrial conferences,
particularly in the initial weeks of the experiment. 26 Cases attrited for any of
these reasons were removed from the analysis with their pairs. This proce-
dure maintains the sampling integrity of the analysis of the 161 cases dis-
cussed below, and we have checked and ascertained that the results of this
preliminary report are not biased by the exclusion of the eliminated cases.27
25 The judges gave information as to counsel present, quality of preparation, matters
stressed (i.e., settlement or preparation of the trial through clarification of issues, etc.),
judge time spent in preparing for and holding the conference and an estimate of the
likelihood of out-of-court settlement or of trial time, as well as a summary evaluation
of the usefulness of that particular pretrial conference.
The collection of the diverse sets of information, and the supervision of the pretrial
conference scheduling, was carried out from a project office in the court house by Ms.
Anne Burke and her associate Ms. Sue Carson. This information was subsequently con-
verted to machine readable files, and computer-analysed, at the Institute for Behavioural
Research, York University, with the assistance of Ms. Mirka Ondracek.
26 The major reason for attrition was that the early cohorts contained many more
(test) cases than there were available pretrial conference slots. Hence, some test cases
were never summoned to a pretrial conference and were attrited (with their control
pair). A second reason for attrition was that one or both of the paired cases were called
to trial before the holding of the pretrial conference. A third reason was that a number
of test cases, when summoned to the pretrial conference, indicated they had already
settled and were consequently attrited along with their pairs. A very small number of
cases were attrited due to the failure or refusal of counsel to appear at the pretrial
conference.
27 The checks conducted indicate: (a) amongst the cases not analysed because of
reserved judgments, there were a greater number of control as opposed to test cases that
had gone to trial rather than settled; (b) amongst the cases struck or adjourned sine die,
more of these were test than control cases, but the settlement rate for the control cases
paired with struck or adjourned test cases was not greater than that reported for the
control group in our analysis, and the exclusion of these cases does not bias the conclu-
sions from our analysis; (c) an examination of the 100 cases attrited revealed no dis-
tributional differences in amounts in dispute or manner of disposition inconsistent with
the control cases analysed. In short, except for attrition, these cases were not atypical.
Further, it should be noted that in this preliminary analysis the cut off point of 307
1977]
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In summary, the composition of the sample used for analysis and the distri-
bution of the attrition is as follows:
161 cases analysed (81 test; 80 control) 28
100 cases attrited (50 pairs)
30 cases struck off the list or adjourned sine die (15 pairs)
16 cases under reserved judgment (8 pairs)
307 TOTAL
The present status of the project is that the sampling of cases and the
conduct of pretrials is now complete; the last conference having been held in
May 1977. In total, some 940 cases have been taken into the experiment. As
already indicated, the analysis presented here is based upon 161 usable cases
from the first 307 cases sampled. The balance of the cases (approximately
630) remain to be disposed of by settlement or trial and to be fully coded.20
It is hoped that the final report from the project will be available in the
spring of 1978.
C. ANALYSIS
The analysis that follows examines the extent to which pretrial confer-
ences affect the settlement rate of cases,30 the time spent in trial, and the
speed, as opposed to the rate, of settlement. Further, in light of these effects,
we assess the impact of the use of pretrial conferences on the court's effi-
ciency. Finally, we explore whether there are differences in the substantive
outcome of cases resulting from the use of pretrial conferences. Also, as-
sessed, wherever possible, is the extent to which pretrial conferences produce
differential effects as a result of differences in the characteristics of cases, i.e.,
the type of litigation and the amount in dispute or because of differences in
the characteristics of the pretrial conference procedures employed, i.e., the
identity of the presiding judge and the level of preparation of participating
counsel.
1. Impact of Pretrial Conferences on Settlement Rates
a. For All Cases
The effectiveness of pretrial conferences as a means of increasing the
rate of settlement can be estimated initially by an examination of the data
in Table 1. The Table shows that 86.4% of the cases pretried were disposed
28 It so happened that one cohort (sampling block) contained an uneven number
of cases. Through random assignment, this case ended up in the test group.
29 As of November 1, 1977 approximately 160 cases still remain to be disposed of
by trial or settlement. We anticipate that the bulk of these cases will be disposed of by
the end of December 1977.
80 It is important to note with regard to the analysis presented below, that when
we speak of settlement rates we are talking about the settlement rate of those cases
taken into the experiment and used in the analysis (i.e., not attrited). These settlement
rates do not represent the overall settlement rates of cases on the Toronto non-jury list.
This latter figure will be higher because if a case was settled prior to the sampling point,
it never became part of the experiment.
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of by settlement, in contrast to a settlement rate of 68.8% for those cases not
pretried. Expressed differently, the evidence indicates that pretrial confer-
ences increased the rate of disposition by settlement by slightly more than
25%. This difference in settlement rates can be inferred to be the result of
pretrial conferences because, given experimental control, the only alternative
explanation would be chance. The statistical significance of the differences
observed (i.e., p. -5 .005) is such that these results could be obtained by
chance in only five out of 1,000 random assignments of this number of cases
to experimental or control groups.81
TABLE 1
Disposition by Settlement or Judgment for Cases With and Without Pretrial
Conference Experience
DISPOSITION:
Judgment Settlement
Total:
CONTROL 25 cases 55 cases 80 cases
(No Pretrial) (31.2%) (68.8%) (100%)
EXPERIMENTAL.
SELECTION:
TEST 11 cases 70 cases 81 cases
(Pretrial) (13.6%) (86.4%) (100%)
Conference)
Total: 36 cases 125 cases 161 cases
X 2 = 7.19
p. "5 .005
At the 95% confidence level, a confidence interval of _± 10.2% can be placed around
the 68.8% settlement rate for the control group. At the same confidence level the interval
is ±L 7.51% around the 86.6% settlement rate in the test group.
While the data in Table 1 indicate a marked difference in the proportion
of cases disposed of by settlement rather than by judgment, this Table does
not distinguish between cases settling prior to trial and cases settling in trial.
Some cases settle only after the trial has commenced. Table 1 groups as
"settled," cases settled before trial and cases settled during trial. Because this
31 We refer to statistical significance as a means of indicating the confidence with
which we can decide that differences between pretried and non-pretried cases are due
to exposure to pretrial conferences, rather than to chance. (Because of the controlled
nature of the experiment we can reject, a priori, alternative substantive hypotheses as
an explanation of differences). "Statistical significance" is simply the phrase used to
describe the probability that differences observed between (or within) random samples
are a result of chance. By social science convention, when the probability that the ob-
served difference could have resulted from chance is fewer than 5 times in 100 (p 2 .05),
the hypothesis that the differences do result from chance is rejected in favour of sub-
stantive explanations for the differences. When this probability is greater than 5 times in
100, the convention is to retain chance as a reasonable competing explanation for the
observed differences.
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latter group clearly involves the use of judge time in court, the impact of
pretrial conferences on the productivity of the court as suggested by Table 1
will vary depending upon the balance between in trial as opposed to pretrial
settlements. Table 2, therefore, specifies the effect of pretrial conferences on
settlement before trial, during trial, or disposition by judgment.
TABLE 2
Disposition of Cases by Settlement Without Trial, Settlement During Trial, and
Judgment After Trial
DISPOSITION:
Judgment Settlement Settlement
after trial during trial without trial
CONTROL
(No Pretrial)
EXPERIMENTAL
SELECTION:
TEST
(Pretrial
Conference)
80
(100%)
(100%)
81
Total: 36 cases 26 cases 99 cases 161
X2 = 9.7
p. --- .007
The more detailed information in Table 2 confirms the suggestion in
Table 1 that greater efficiency in the disposition of cases results from the
use of pretrial conferences. It is apparent from the data in Table 2 that the
rate of settlement without trial is substantially greater in the test group
(72.8%) than in the control group (50%): the rate of disposition only after
full trial proceedings and judgment is substantially lower in the test group
(13.6%) than in the control group (18.8%). The statistical significance of
the differences in these rates of disposition is marked (p. -9 .007), indicating
that such differences could be expected by chance, only 7 times in 1,000.
Therefore, the general conclusions indicated, are that pretrial confer-
ences increase the number of settlements prior to trial by 48% and reduce
the number of trials required to obtain a disposition (either by settlement or
judgment) by 45%.
On the basis of these preliminary results, the impact of pretrial confer-
ences is substantial. As well, this is surprising in light of the results from
Rosenberg's study.
One important difference between the situation studied by Rosenberg
and the one reported on here is that the New Jersey court had for some time
previous to the Rosenberg experiment employed pretrial conferences, where-
as in the Toronto non-jury list no such procedure had been used prior to the
25 cases 15 cases 40 cases
(31.2%) (18.8%) (50%)
11 cases 11 cases 59 cases
(13.6%) (13.6%) (72.8%)
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start of our experiment.32 That is, Rosenberg studied an established proce-
dure, whereas we are studying a new procedure. Thus it is possible that the
novelty of the pretrial conference, rather than its substance, played a role in
producing the difference between test and control cases in our experiment
and the extent of these differences may diminish over time as the Bar be-
comes more familiar with the procedure.3 3 Further, the differences between
test and control groups may be due simply to the effect of increased court
interest in a case as perceived by counsel rather than the particular vehicle
through which this interest was expressed (i.e., the pretrial conference).
It should be noted that the findings here may be influenced by a "Haw-
thorne Effect."'3 4 That is, the difference between test and control cases evident
in Tables 1 and 2 may be due to attempts by the participants to modify their
behaviour so as to fit in with their perception of the kinds of behaviour ex-
pected to result from the experiment. In other words, it is possible the parti-
cipants were particularly interested in achieving the settlement of cases
through pretrial because they knew an experiment was being conducted. It
82 Other presently apparent differences between the two studies include the follow-
ing: (2) nearly all of Rosenberg's cases were headed for jury trial, whereas ours are
all non-jury cases; (3) Rosenberg's cases were all personal injury cases, while ours are
mixed (but with an identified sample of personal injury cases); (4) the vast majority of
Rosenberg's cases involved small claims, by comparison our cases involve relatively
large claims (see note 42, infra); (5) whereas in Rosenberg's study a very large number
of judges (some 49 different judges) conducted pretrials, for the cases reported on here
in our study only 4 judges conducted the pretrials; Rosenberg's judges were (presumably)
a cross-section of the bench, whereas ours were highly motivated, favoured pretrial and
were selected (by the court) for this reason (see infra, note 35); (6) in our study a
ground rule was that the pretrial judge was disqualified from trying the case, whereas
this was not so in New Jersey; (7) in our study it was clearly understood by the pretrial
judges (and probably by counsel) that the purpose of the conference was to try and
achieve settlement; in New Jersey it appears that the pretrial judges may have pursued
more diverse goals. In addition, there are significant methodological differences between
the two studies; in New Jersey the "control" cases were allowed to opt for a pretrial
conference (see note 5, supra), thereby reducing the degree of experimental control,
whereas this was not permitted in our study; we have employed the devices of "pairing"
and "attrition" which Rosenberg did not.
33 We may be able to explore the plausibility of this "newness" effect as influencing
the difference in settlement rates between test and control groups, by making use of the
multiple or replicate sampling procedure employed in this study, whereby samples were
drawn from segments of the list at different times during the progress of the study. We
have examined the breakdown for Table 1 in the four independent samples drawn be-
tween April and August 1976. To date, there is no alternation of the difference in settle-
ment rates as we move from the early to the later sample "cohorts" (i.e., the difference
in settlement rates between test and control groups was consistent throughout the five
month period). However, even if differences due to the novelty of the pretrial conference
procedure were in effect they would be unlikely to wear off so early. Such a decrease
in the differences between test and control groups may yet become apparent in the data
for cases entering the experiment after the period he reported. However, of course, this
effect may be present but not demonstrable at all during the course of the experiment.
34 So called after a famous experiment at the Hawthorne plant of the Western
Electric Company in the 1920's, in which it was found that the observed effects were
caused by the fact of participation in an experiment and not by the variables being
studied experimentally. See F. J. Roethlisberger, and W. J. Dickson, Management and
the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1939).
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may be that this interest produced the substantial positive results we have
reported, which might not have resulted from pretrial conferences in a non-
experimental setting.3 5
There are two additional factors which may also effect settlement rates
and which by chance may not be randomly distributed between the test and
control groups. These are "payments into court '30 and informal conferences
conducted between the trial judge and counsel on the day of trial.3 7 For this
report, we have been unable to code and analyse information on these two
variables and, therefore, we need to caution that when analysed, these factors
may modify the preliminary conclusions drawn here on the impact of pretrial
conferences.88
Some of the cases reported on here were subject, in addition to their
differential exposure to pretrial, to another judicial intervention, a "trial
blitz" procedure used by the court to increase judicial manpower and control
5 In our view, the likelihood of their being a Hawthorne effect of the kind de-
scribed in the text as a result of the behaviour of participating counsel is quite low.
However, it seems to us that such an effect might well have resulted from the behaviour
of the four participating judges, since they were all strongly committed to making the
pretrial conference program work effectively, and they were chosen, in part, to conduct
the pretrials for just such reasons.
Alternatively, it may be the case that these particular judges behaved in the experi-
ment as they would in a non-experimental situation and that the relevant caveat is
whether their commitment to the desirability of achieving settlement through pretrial
conferences is representative of the commitment of the Court as a whole.
36Payment into court is a procedure by which a defendant may deposit monies
with the court by way of an offer to settle the plaintiff's claim. This payment is not
revealed to the trial judge until after he has given his decision on the merits of the case.
(See the Ontario Rules of Practice, Rules 306 et seq). The important impact of this rule
is that if a plaintiff refuses the monies paid into court and subsequently at trial he fails
to recover more than the amount paid into court, he will normally be ordered to pay
the defendant's costs (including lawyers' fees) from the date of the payment into court.
This will, of course, include the very significant trial costs. When a realistic payment
into court is made it obviously (because of these cost consequences) puts a great
pressure on the plaintiff to settle. However, it should be noted that among the cases here
analysed the proportion of cases in which a payment into court was made was not high.
3 7 In the High Court of Ontario it is not uncommon for the trial judge to have
conferences with counsel involved in the case either immediately prior to the commence-
ment of the trial and/or during the course of the trial. At such conferences the possibili-
ty or desirability of settling the case may be discussed, in a variety of ways. Some judges
may vigorously pursue settlement at such conferences, particularly where they take place
prior to the commencement of the trial. Even judges who do not feel this is an appro-
priate role for the trial judge may, during the course of the trial, call counsel into their
chambers and indicate to them their tentative assessment of the evidence to date, e.g.,
that to date the plaintiff's case is going very badly because his witnesses have not been
believable.
38We anticipate no difficulty in eventually analysing the date with regard to pay-
ments into court. However, with regard to informal conferences between judge and
counsel, a lack of accurate information may prohibit any reliable analysis of this factor.
All judges trying cases which were a part of the experiment (including both test
and control cases) were provided with a form which required them to note whether, in
respect of every case, they had one or more conferences with counsel concerning the
case. At present we are uncertain as to reliability of the reporting in respect of this
information.
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over the list in order to reduce the existing backlog.39 However, both test and
control cases were equally subject to the "blitz" and there seems no reason
why it would have had a different effect on one group rather than the other.
Some of the cohorts not yet coded or analysed were not subject to the "blitz"
experience and in the final report we hope to be able to analyse the difference
between cases that were, and were not, subject to this blitz.
b. Differences in the Impact of Pretrial Conferences on Settlement Rate
due to Subject Matter
Given the apparent impact of pretrial conferences on the settlement rate
of all cases in the experiment, we now turn to a more detailed analysis of its
impact on particular types of cases, i.e., on personal injury cases as compared
with non personal injury cases.
Table 3 shows the differences in settlement rates for personal injury
cases and non personal injury cases within the test and control groups. Each
box indicates the percentage of cases of that kind which settled, e.g., of the
personal injury cases that were in the control group, 83% settled, etc.
TABLE 3
Impact of Pretrial Conferences and Type of Litigation (Personal Injury and
Non Personal Injury) on the Rate of Settlement
EXPERIMENTAL SELECTION
CONTROL TEST
Personal Injury
47 Cases
TYPE OF
LITIGATION
Other
114 Cases
Significance Tests for Differences
Source of Variation F Ratio Significance of F
(a) Experimental Selection 7.531 .007
(b) Type of Litigation 5.431 .020
(c) 2-Way Interaction .187 .999
N.B. 1. The above significance tests indicate that: (a) there are only 7 chances in 1000
that the difference in the probability of settlement due to the presence or absence
of pre-trial conference exposure could have occurred by chance; (b) there are
only 2 chances in 100 that the difference in the probability of settlement associated
with the different types of litigation could be expected by chance; (c) the evidence
indicates there is no differential effect of pre-trial conferences in personal injury
cases as opposed to non personal injury cases.
2. The settlements referred to in this table include both pre-trial and in-trial
settlements.
89 See supra, note 17.
83% 96%
63% 82%
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Several observations can be made with respect to the data in Table 3.
First, it is apparent that even without the pretrial conference there is a higher
settlement rate among personal injury cases (83%) than among non per-
sonal injury cases (63%). Second, the settlement rate in both classes of
cases is increased by a pretrial conference: from 83% to 96% in personal
injury cases, while that of non personal injury cases is increased from 63%
to 82%. Third, notwithstanding the very high rate of settlement result-
ing when personal injury cases are pretried (96%), there is no evidence
of any differential affect of pretrial conferences in personal injury cases as
opposed to non personal injury cases, that is, pretrial conferences are neither
more, nor less, effective with respect to personal injury or non personal
injury cases.40
As part of the experiment, these two basic subject matter classifications
have been further broken down as follows: personal injury (motor vehicle
and other); non personal injury (real estate, contract, and other). Because of
the small number of cases being analysed as the basis of this interim report,
no attempt has been made to measure the impact of pretrial conferences on
these further subject matter breakdowns. However, in the final report, when
a much larger volume of cases is available to be analysed, we hope to be able
to measure the differences of settlement rates associated with these further
sub-classifications.
c. Differences in the Impact of Pretrial Conferences on Settlement Rates
due to Amount in Dispute
Although no differential impact of pretrial conference is apparent as
between personal injury and non personal injury cases, is there such an im-
pact as a function of other aspects of the cases set down for trial, i.e., as
between cases involving different amounts in dispute?
Table 4 shows the difference in settlement rates for cases involving dif-
ferent amounts in dispute within the test and control groups. The first, and
most surprising factor indicated by this Table is again unrelated to the im-
pact of the pretrial conference. This is, the dramatically lower settlement
rate, with or without pretrial intervention, for cases involving relatively small
amounts in dispute, as compared to cases involving more substantial mone-
tary claims.4 1
40 This third point follows from the significance test for the two-way interaction
reported in Table 3. The finding that pretrial conferences are no more, nor less, effective
in personal injury as opposed to non-personal injury cases or (see note 42, inlra) in
cases of small or large amounts in dispute, have important implications with regard to
how a court should use available pretrial judge time (at least where that is a limited
resource). For example, the non-differential impact would suggest giving pretrial priority
to those classes of cases which are likely to produce the longest trials (e.g., cases where
large amounts are in dispute).
41 One possible explanation for the phenomenon is that the $0 - $19,900 category
of cases, includes cases in which no monetary relief was claimed, e.g., specific perform-
ance cases, and the possibility that these cases are more difficult to settle. However, to
date there are too few cases involving equitable relief to determine whether or not they
are more difficult to settle. See also the following note.
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TABLE 4
Impact of Pretrial Conferences and the Amounts in Dispute on the Rate of
Settlement of Cases
EXPERIMENTAL SELECTION:
AMOUNT IN DISPUTE: CONTROL TEST
$ 0 - 19,900
(50 cases)
$20,000 - 50,000
(47 cases)
$50,000 +
(64 cases)
Significance Test for Differences
Source of Variation F Ration Significance of F
(a) Experimental Selection 7.249 .008
(b) Size of Claims 5.235 .006
(c) 2-Way Interaction .149 .999
N.B. 1. The above significance tests indicate that: (a) there are only 8 chances in 1,000
that the difference in the probability of settlement due to the presence or absence
of pretrial conference exposure could have occurred by chance; (b) there are
only 6 chances in 1,000 that the difference in the probability of settlement asso-
ciated with the difference size of claims could be expected by chance; (c) the
evidence indicates there is no differential effect of pretrial conferences in respect
of cases involving different amounts in dispute.
2. The settlements referred to in this table include both pretrial and in-trial
settlements.
A second observation is that the pretrial conference has a positive effect
upon the settlement rate of cases in all three categories and the relative
magnitude of the effect of pretrial conferences is more or less similar for
cases involving small, medium and large amounts in dispute, i.e., pretrial
conferences raise the absolute proportion of such cases settled rather than
going to judgment by about 20%. The third conclusion, which follows from
the second, is that the pretrial conference appears to have no differential im-
pact on the settlement rate of cases involving different amounts in dispute.42
42 The inferences drawn in the text from Table 4 may be to some extent an artifact
of the categorization of the amounts in dispute and finer breakdowns of any of these
categories might well reveal differential effects. For example, a distinction between cases
involving less than $10,000 and cases involving larger amounts in dispute might reveal
that for these smallest cases pretrial conferences have no effect. We are grateful to
Professor Maurice Rosenberg for suggesting this point.
We should here elaborate another difference between Rosenberg's and our studies.
The vast majority of cases in Rosenberg's study involved relatively small amounts, e.g.,
in 68% of his cases the recovery was less than $3,000, and in only 14% of his cases
was the recovery in excess of $6,000. By contrast, our cases (because the lower, County
Courts have jurisdiction over claims up to $7,500) will all, or nearly all, involve claims
in excess of $7,500.
54% 71%
74% 96%
77% 91%
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2. Impact of Pretrial Conferences on Trial Time
The number of cases actually going to trial in this preliminary sample
is too small to allow a precise analysis of the impact on time spent in trial.
However, we can give some indication of the likely conclusions by comparing
the test and control groups, i.e., by computing the trial time for the 81 test
cases and for the 80 control cases. Table 5 summarizes the distribution of
time in trial for the test and control groups and gives the total time involved
in trials for each of these two groups. The figures indicate an absolute reduc-
tion in total trial time in favour of the test (pretried) cases of 140.25 hours.
The differences in trial times for cases on the two lists are not statistically
significant, but approach significance (p. . .09). The reduction in total trial
time is, of course, largely attributable to the substantially higher pretrial set-
tlement rate of the test cases, i.e., many more control group cases (40) went
to trial than did test group cases (22). Thus, this calculation of differences
in total trial time, cannot be viewed as a benefit additional to that of an in-
creased settlement rate for pretried cases: it is simply another way of measur-
ing the overall impact of the pretrial conference procedure.
TABLE 5
TIME IN TRIAL
TEST GROUP CONTROL GROUP
Hours # of cases % of cases # of cases % of cases
0 59 72.8% 39* 48.7%
.25 - 1 5 6.1% 10 12.5%
1.25 - 2 2 2.5% 3 3.7%
2.25 - 4 5 6.1% 6 7.4%
4.25 - 7 2 2.5% 6 7.4%
7.25 - 10 3 2.5% 6 7.4%
10.25 - 20 2 3.6% 7 8.4%
20. - 80 2 2.5% 3 3.6%
missing 1 1.2%
81 100% 80 100%
TOTAL TIME
IN TRIAL 158 hours 298 hours
* 0 trial time indicates cases settled before trial. This figure (39) is one less than the
figure reported in Table 2 for the number of control cases settling without trial. The
difference is accounted for by an infant settlement case (coded as a pretrial settlement)
which took more than a quarter of an hour of trial time to obtain judicial approval.
All infant settlements must be approved by the court.
Any reduction in average in-trial time would represent an additional
benefit to that of an increased pretrial settlement rate.43 Calculating the aver-
43A reduction in average in-trial time might be due to the effects of pretrial con-
ferences in making for speedier in-trial settlements and/or in reducing the trial time tojudgment. Given the small number of cases going to trial to date we have made no
attempt in this Table to separate cases settled in trial from those going to judgment.
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age in-trial time for all cases which went to trial, we find that the average
in-trial time for test cases is 158/22 = 7.18 hours as compared to 298.25/40
= 7.46 for control cases. Consequently the differences in average trial time
for test and control cases is not (for these data) substantial. Whether or not
such differences become more substantial in the final analysis of all cases
studied in this project, remains an important question.
3. Overall Impact on Court Efficiency
While the use of pretrial conferences may have other benefits (e.g., a
reduction of the expense and delay experienced by individual litigants) an
important question is the ability of the procedure to increase the efficiency
of the operations of the court. In this context, the crucial question is whether
pretrial conferences reduce the amount of judicial time spent in disposing of
a given number of cases? Basically, this can be calculated by offsetting against
any savings in trial time the judicial time expended in conducting pretrial
conferences.
The aggregate trial time consumed by the test and control cases has
already been set forth in Table 5. Table 6 shows the actual, direct, judicial
time expended in conducting the pretrial conferences in the test cases ana-
lysed to date. (This information was derived from the questionnaire filled
out by each judge presiding at the pretrial conference.) The Table shows the
distribution of time spent by judges in preparing for pretrial conferences, and
in presiding over the conference sessions and, in each case, the aggregate
times involved.
TABLE 6
Time in Pretrial Conference
Time for Judge Time in
Time Preparation Conference
# of Cases # of Cases
0 4 0
0 - 5 Minutes 15 4
6- 10 26 0
10- 15 19 6
16 - 20 3 4
21 - 30 5 28
31 - 40 0 19
41 - 50 1 8
51 - 80 0 3
Missing (i.e. no information 8 9
provided by judge) 81 81
Total time involved 14.58 hours 38.03 hours
Adjusting for Missing 8x.20= 1.60 9x.53 =4.77
data by adding average time 16.18 hours 42.80 hours
How the total judicial time expended in conducting pretrial conferences
should be calculated presents some difficulties. Obviously conducting pretrial
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conferences (on a regular basis) consumes more judge time than can be
measured simply by aggregating the time spent preparing for, and actually
conducting, each pretrial conference held: additional judge "down-time" re-
sults from gaps in the pretrial conference schedule, and while assigned pre-
trial conferences, a judge is kept away (possibly for the whole day) from
trial duty. On the other hand, the calculation of trial time used in this experi-
ment includes only the actual in-court trial time expended on each case: it
does not include the time spent by the judge in preparing for trial or in writ-
ing reasons for judgment, or any "down-time" in which the court recessed for
chamber's conferences between counsel and the judge or adjourned for other
purposes (e.g., for discussion between counsel). On balance (at least until
we have more information on these matters) it seems reasonable to assume
that there is an equivalent amount of "down-time" 44 expended in conducting
both trials and pretrial conferences, and aggregate only the actual time spent
by the judges in presiding over pretrial conferences.
Taking this approach, as Table 7 indicates, there is a difference of 97.45
hours (in favour of the pretried cases) in the aggregate judge time spent in
disposing of the test and control cases. Based on these figures, universal pre-
trial conferences would result in a 33 % reduction in judge time required to
dispose of cases on this civil non-jury list.
TABLE 7
Impact of Pretrial Conferences On Judge Time
Spent in Disposing of Cases
Total in Total in
Trial Time P.T.C. Time Total
Control
(80 Cases) 298.25 hrs. + - 298.25 hours
Test
(81 Cases) 158 hrs. + 42.80 hrs. = 200.80 hours
Difference 97.45 hours
A further way of expressing this overall effect of the pretrial conference is to
express the above conclusion in terms of "average judge time spent per dis-
position." For test cases this would be 200.8/81 = 2.48 hours, and for con-
trol cases would be 298.5/80 = 3.73 hours.
How would the saving in judge time, resulting from the use of pretrial
conferences, translate into increased court productivity? That is, how would
the reduction in judge time, using pretrial conferences, affect the absolute
number of cases disposed of in a given number of judge hours? The increase
44 If anything the "down-time" in trial is probably greater (and it can be hypothe-
sized that pretrial conferences may decrease trial "down-time" for pretried cases going
to trial). Moreover, the scheduling "holes" experienced in conducting pretrial confer-
ences to date were to a large extent necessitated by the experiment itself: in non-
experimental conditions more flexible and efficient scheduling may be possible.
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can be estimated in the following way. Using the figures in Table 7, if all 161
cases had proceeded without a pretrial conference they would have consumed
approximately 600 judge hours. Had all been pretried only 400 judge hours
approximately would have been consumed. In the 200 hours thus saved the
court could dispose of a further 80 cases (employing pretrial conferences),
thereby increasing the number of cases disposed of (241 rather than 161)
by 50%.
4. Time to Settlement
We have already seen that pretrial conferences increase the likelihood
that a case will be disposed of by settlement rather than by judgment after
trial. Do pretrial conferences also produce a further benefit to litigants in the
form of a more rapid settlement?
Calculating the time which elapsed from the date which cases were set
down for trial to the date on which settlements were reported (for all settled
cases, including both pretrial and in-trial settlements), our preliminary evi-
dence is that the average time to settlement for pretried cases was 353 days,
as opposed to 404 days for cases that were not pretried. This difference is not
significant (p. 5 .09) by conventional standards and the average reduction
in time is not very marked. Moreover, the reliability of the data on which
these average times are based is open to question. For test cases, settlement
dates were reported by counsel, as requested at the pretrial conference, di-
rectly to our pretrial administration office and this contact allowed us to
ascertain the actual date of settlement. Information as to the settlement of
control cases was only received through the Trial List Office and on a less
systematic basis. Since some of these cases only reported settlement when
called for trial, their exact date of settlement was only roughly estimated, or
the date of the report had to be treated as the date of settlement. Thus there
is a possible bias in favour of over-estimating time to settlement in the control
cases.
5. Factors Influencing the Efficacy of the Pretrial Conference
Having examined the impact of pretrial conferences on the timing and
manner of disposition of cases on the civil non-jury list, let us now touch
briefly on the internal dynamics of the pretrial conference which may explain
the ways in which the conferences effect the case. We have not systematically
observed pretrial conferences in progress, but have obtained information
from the presiding judges (and will be obtaining further information from
participating members of the Bar) as to the content, emphasis and utility of
these procedures. For the moment, however, all we are in a position to evalu-
ate are preliminary data on the differences in the results of pretrial confer-
ences, depending upon the judge presiding and the level of preparation of
participating counsel.
a. Presiding Judge
Four judges presided over the pretrial conferences in the 81 test cases
reported here. One might suppose that these and other judges would vary in
their ability to stimulate settlement through pretrial conferences. The only
indirect evidence we have of the likelihood of such variation is the rate of
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settlement for the cases pretried by each judge. As it happens, there was a
variation in the settlement rate of the groups of cases pretried by each judge.
One hundred percent of the cases pretried by one judge were disposed of by
settlement; another judge pretried a group of cases of which 90% settled; a
third judge was involved in pretrials in which 83 % of the cases settled; and
a fourth pretried cases of which only 72% settled. However, this last judge
requested that only non personal injury cases be assigned to him and, as
indicated already in this report, those cases have a significantly lower condi-
tional probability of settlement. Moreover, this self-selection of cases by the
fourth judge resulted in another judge receiving an increased proportion of
personal injury cases for pretrial. In any event, the number of cases that each
judge dealt with was never more than 24 and proportional settlement rates
for such small numbers must be treated with caution. Moreover, to properly
isolate the impact of the presiding judge would require control over other
factors affecting rates of settlement, e.g., the amount in dispute and the type
of litigation.
Therefore, whether the identity or ability of the presiding judge is a
factor influencing the efficacy of the pretrial conference is a question that
cannot be resolved at this time. We hope that the larger sample to be ana-
lysed in the final report will permit an analysis of this question in greater
depth.
b. Preparation of Counsel
A second characteristic of the pretrial conferences that may be expected
to affect the impact of the procedure on settlement rates is the preparation
of participating counsel. We obtained from the presiding judges their assess-
ment of the quality of preparation of counsel. The first point to emphasize
is the generally high quality of preparation. In 75% of the pretrial confer-
ences, the judges were satisfied that both counsel for plaintiff and defendant
were well prepared. In only 11% of the conferences were there any assess-
ments that both counsel were not well prepared. This said, it is also apparent
that the settlement rates following conferences in which all counsel were well
prepared are almost identical to those for the conferences at which no counsel
were well prepared, or to those for conferences in which only the counsel for
the plaintiff was well prepared. The only deviation from this pattern is a
significantly lower settlement rate for those cases at which counsel for the
plaintiff was not well prepared and counsel for the defendant was well pre-
pared.
However, considering the very small number of cases in which any
counsel was unprepared, whether or not differences in the preparation of
counsel affect the outcomes of pretrial conferences must await analysis of the
complete set of data from this experiment.
6. Impact of Pretrial Conferences on the Outcome of Cases
The final issue we can discuss on the basis of the data available so far,
relates to the question of whether pretrial conferences affect the outcome of
the litigation. This question has two aspects. First, do pretrial conferences
affect "who wins", i.e., do settlements or judgments tend to go more often in
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favour of defendants or plaintiffs in pretried cases as opposed to non-pretried
cases? Second, do pretrial conferences affect the amount of recovery, i.e., do
plaintiffs recover more (or less) from settlements or judgments in pretried
cases as opposed to non-pretried cases? 45
In connection with the first question of "who wins" in settlements or
judgments as a result of pretrial conferences our data indicate an unexpected
result. Whereas Rosenberg had reported no difference in the recovery rate for
plaintiffs in pretried and non-pretried cases,46 the analysis of our preliminary
data indicates that plaintiffs recover more frequently after pretrial confer-
ences than they did without pretrial conferences. That is, in 95% of our pre-
tried cases the plaintiff recovered something by means of either settlement or
judgment, whereas in non-pretried cases plaintiffs recovered something only
80% of the time.47 The data as to "who wins" in settlements are particularly
interesting. In pretried cases that were disposed of by settlement the plaintiff
always won something. But in those non-pretried cases disposed of by settle-
ment, the plaintiff won something only 85% of the time.48
We will not attempt in this interim report to speculate as to how and
why the pretrial conference should produce this differential impact in terms
of who wins. That is not to say that there are no tempting, "obvious" expla-
nations, e.g., the difference between "who wins" in settlement resulting after
pretrial conference (plaintiffs "win" in 100% of cases) in contrast to settle-
ment without a pretrial conference (in which plaintiffs "win" in only 85%
of the cases) suggest that at the pretrial conference judges tend to recom-
mend that the defendant pay something to plaintiffs with very tenuous cases
in order to settle the case. Assuming a similar pattern emerges from the final
data the impact of the pretrial conference on "who wins" will present a major
issue requiring further analysis in the final report.
Turning to the question of whether pretrial conferences affect the amount
recovered, the preliminary results show that the average recovery (expressed
as a proportion of the original claims) received in settlement or judgment is
31% for the cases that were exposed to pretrial conferences and 24% for
4 5 Another question relevant to the impact of pretrial conferences is whether or not
pretrial conferences improve the "quality" of trials. This is a question that Rosenberg
investigated in his New Jersey experiment (and he reported that there was such a posi-
tive effect: see Rosenberg, supra, note 4 at page 29 et seq. In our view the difficulty of
establishing criteria by which the quality of the trial should be assessed and the further
difficulty of getting reliable data indicating the perceptions of judges and counsel as to
the extent to which these criteria have or have not been met in any case, led us to the
decision not to pursue this issue. Moreover, improving the quality of trials has not been
considered a major objective of pretrial conferences by members of either the bench or
bar in Ontario, for whom the issues of cost, delay and improved court efficiency are
paramount
40 See Rosenberg, supra, note 4 at 60.
47 X 2 = 8.229; .01 > p < .001 indicating that this could have occurred by chance
between 1 time in 100 and 1 time in 1,000. That is, the statistical significance is high.
48 A similar breakdown as to "who wins" in cases terminated by judgment (with
or without pretrial) is not reported here because, owing to the small number of cases
going to judgment, the data could not approach statistical significance.
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cases not so exposed.49 This difference is not significant (p. -E- .25) by nor-
mal scientific criteria, but if a similar difference is present in our final data
the statistical significance will likely increase as a result of the larger number
of cases involved. 0
Hence, it is worth noting that there is an indication that pretrial confer-
ences may favour (either through settlement or judgment) plaintiffs. If such
a substantive bias is established, particularly if it is sufficiently marked in
degree, it may raise questions as to the viability and justifiability of the pre-
trial conference procedure.
D. CONCLUSION
The preliminary results discussed in this interim report suggest that pre-
trial conferences in Ontario have dramatically more impact than would have
been predicted from interpolations based on past research in other juris-
dictions.
Despite the caveats expressed in this report and the marginal statistical
significance of the results dealing with time in trial, it is reasonable to expect
that the analysis of data relating to the balance of the cases in the experiment,
based on a larger sample, will confirm the trends indicated in these prelimi-
nary results. Such a prediction is reasonable given that the data analysed here
are a true random sample, albeit small. In some instances (e.g., the settlement
rate data) the significance levels are already very high. Where the significance
levels are not high (e.g., the data on time in trial) they approach significance
and are reasonably high given the small number of cases that actually go to
trial. It seems probable that the statistical significance of all these results will
increase when the analysis is based upon a larger sample.
We have in this article reported the preliminary results of quantitative
research into the impact of pretrial conferences. This analysis indicates what
happens when pretrial conferences are employed, but it tells us nothing about
the mechanisms by which pretrial conferences produce these impacts. Ob-
viously how and why pretrial conferences have these impacts are interesting
questions, the answers to which may have important implications in terms
of both the likely long-term effect of pretrial conferences and their desirability
in terms of social policy.
49 Rosenberg, supra note 4 at 61 et seq, reported that plaintiffs recovered appreci-
ably more in pretried cases than in non-pretried cases. He reported they recovered 20-
30% more measured by the average or medium recovery, not by comparison (as in our
figures) of the amount recovered as a percentage of the amount claimed.50 It is to be noted that the data on amounts recovered mentioned in the text are
for all dispositions, whether by settlement or judgment. Differences in percentage re-
covery may vary as between cases terminated by judgment or settlement: we have been
unable to breakdown our present data in this way. It may be particularly interesting to
see whether a significant proportion of pretried cases settle for nominal monetary
awards, i.e., whether the difference between "wins" at settlements (100% for plaintiffs
in pretried cases, as opposed to 85% recovery for the plaintiffs in non-pretried cases)
is to be explained in part or in total by the fact that while plaintiffs win at settlement
after pretrial, often all that is involved is a nominal recovery.
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In our final report we hope to analyse not only the quantitative impact
of pretrial conferences based on the more extensive set of cases to be ana-
lysed, but also to explore some of the qualitative aspects of the implementa-
tion of a pretrial conference procedure.
ADDENDUM
Since this article was submitted for publication the Ontario Rules Com-
mittee has passed a rule, effective March 1, 1978, providing for the holding
of pretrial conferences. The rule provides as follows:
Pre-Trial Conference
244(1) When an action, cause or matter has been set down for trial or hearing,
the Court, upon the application of a party or upon its own motion, may, in its
discretion, direct the solicitors for the parties or any party not represented by
solicitor, to appear before it, in the case of the solicitors, with or without the
parties, for a conference to consider:
(a) the simplification of the issues;
(b) the possibility of obtaining admissions which might facilitate the trial
or hearing;
(c) the quantum of damages;
(d) estimating the duration of the trial;
(e) fixing a date for the trial or hearing;
(f) the advisability of directing a reference;
or
(g) any other matters that may aid in the disposition of the action, cause
or matter or the attainment of justice.
(2) Following the conference, the Court may make an order reciting the
results of the conference and giving such directions as the Court considers neces-
sary or advisable. If such an order is made, it shall thenceforth control the course
of action, cause or matter, provided that the judge at the trial or hearing may
modify the order as he deems just.
(3) The judge who conducts a pre-trial conference in any action, cause or
matter shall be deemed not to be seized of such action, cause or matter and shall
not thereafter try or hear such action, cause or matter.
(4) All documents which may be of assistance in achieving the purposes of
the pre-trial conference, such as medical reports and reports of experts, shall be
made available to the judge presiding at the pre-trial conference.
(5) The costs of the pre-trial conference are to be in the discretion of thejudge presiding at the pre-trial conference.
(6) Nothing in this rule shall prevent a judge before whom a case has been
called for trial from holding such a conference either before or during the trial
without disqualifying himself from trying the action.
It is worth noting that this new rule makes no express reference to the
obtaining of a settlement as one of the purposes of the pretrial conference.
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